world of warships forums defense of naval station newport

I gather the error has been recognised and that study dropped The bottom line is that several generations of US officers were brought up believing it was our fault on defective and incomplete facts. It suggests the same report/study strongly influenced Samuel Morrison in writing 'The Struggle for Guadalcanal' (I've not had time to go back and see to what extent it is reflected in his writing). And they certainly hadn't recognised that the damage to Canberra could almost only have been caused by Bagley (the ships tracks are shown in the book).

On the other hand, based on a secret report not release to Australia until 1971 and the basis of a Study taught at the USN Newport War College, the blame was put on Crutchley, HMAS Canberra, the RAAF search aircraft and the RAAF communications - all based on completely false facts. It certainly didn't acknowledge that Bagley torpedoed the Canberra nor analysed the breakdown in.allied airforce communication that caused the sighting of the Japanese not to be passed on. As he points out Hepburn's report was solely concerned with the performance of the Cruisers and prepared for Admiral King. My comments are based upon a slightly more detailed analysis of US reports and attitudes by Bruce Loxton in'The RAN in WWII'. I have a copy of the book and it is excellent (although not as good as his 'Cruiser' about HMAS Perth)

World of warships forums defense of naval station newport